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FOREWORD
The United States is currently a leading player in
the military coalition waging war against the Islamic
State Organization (often called by its older name of
the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham or ISIS) in Iraq
and Syria. The purpose of this coalition was initially
to rollback and degrade ISIS capabilities and then ultimately to destroy the organization. This effort has
been made in coordination with the Iraqi government,
regional allies, allies from outside of the region, and
local anti-ISIS groups including various Kurdish organizations. An important part of this strategy is to disrupt, reduce, and if possible, eliminate major sources
of ISIS revenue, thereby hollowing out the organization from the inside while it is under pressure. The
most well-known sources of ISIS funding are oil stolen from the areas the group now occupies and “taxes” and fines levied on the populations under their
control.
Another important, but less well-known, source of
funding is the sale of stolen archeological treasures,
which is one of ISIS’s outrages against world heritage
(although other groups in both Iraq and Syria are
also involved in antiquities looting on a lesser scale).
ISIS crimes against important archeological sites and
museums in Iraq and Syria include the destruction of
cherished world heritage treasures and the illicit sale
of many easily transportable objects. The destruction
of such sites has emerged as an important ISIS propaganda and recruiting tool, while the unlawful sale of
such objects (and some extremely high quality fakes)
contributes significantly to ISIS finances. Moreover,
allied bombing has destroyed a great deal of the ISIScontrolled infrastructure used to refine and transport oil, harming ISIS profits. Smuggling small, but
vii

extremely valuable items, such as ancient coins, jewelry, glass, statuettes, and other such items, is inherently easier than moving tanker trucks filled with oil
across the international borders, and will become particularly important in the effort to keep ISIS alive and
relevant as other sources of revenue are eliminated or
interdicted. Should ISIS be comprehensively defeated
in Syria and Iraq, it must not be allowed to retain access to any source of significant future revenue that
may allow it to survive and potentially rebuild at some
more opportune time. Hidden relics trafficked along
with high quality reproductions marketed as genuine
could be the lifeline a defeated ISIS needs to survive.
Under these circumstances, preventing antiquities
from falling into ISIS hands or being sold for significant sums of money has become an international security issue as well as a cultural and moral necessity for
the world. In this Letort Paper, Dr. W. Andrew Terrill
looks at the increasingly shaky basis of ISIS financing
and considers the ways in which smuggling antiquities has become more important to ISIS and more efficient and systematized. In doing so, he considers a
problem that has often been treated as an afterthought
in the struggle with ISIS. It is, however, a problem that
U.S. political and military leaders must consider carefully as part of the military planning process in conflicts to which the United States is a party. Providing
adequate protection to world heritage sites or interdicting enemy forces besieging these sites is often as
important as destroying elements of their battlefield
units, since terrorist forces cannot be recruited, trained,
equipped, supplied, and paid without a continued
flow of resources to their leadership.
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The Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) is pleased to
offer this Letort Paper as a contribution to the national security debate on how to defeat ISIS, and how
to help establish a foundation for a more stable and
less radical Middle East. This analysis should be especially useful to U.S. strategic leaders, policy analysts,
and intelligence professionals as they seek to address
the complicated interplay of factors related to regional
security issues, fighting terrorism, and the support of
local allies. It is hoped that this work will be of benefit
to officers of all services as well as other U.S. Government officials involved in supporting current operations, and that it will be directly relevant to planners
working as part of Operation INHERENT RESOLVE.
The work may also be useful in considering future
conflicts beyond Iraq and Syria where antiquities looting and terrorist financing and propaganda overlap.

			
DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
			Director
			
Strategic Studies Institute and
			
U.S. Army War College Press
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SUMMARY
The crimes of the Islamic State Organization (often
called by its older name of the Islamic State of Iraq
and al-Sham or ISIS) against important archeological
sites and museums in Iraq and Syria are major and
ongoing cultural catastrophes. ISIS leaders have stated that they are destroying pre-Islamic artifacts and
structures because they are idolatrous, but their motivations and actions are significantly shrewder and
more nuanced than this ultra-radical and propagandistic formulation. ISIS seeks spectacular acts of terrorism and defiance to bring in new recruits and to
help intimidate opponents on the ground. It also seeks
to project strength in order to limit potential resistance
in the areas under its control. Beyond these concerns,
the organization must generate funds in spite of U.S.led efforts to bankrupt it. By both destroying and selling antiquities, ISIS is therefore seeking to meet some
of its most important goals for organizational survival
beyond its current battlefield setbacks.
While ISIS is not the only group looting sites in
Syria and Iraq, ISIS actions are significantly more
destructive than those of other groups, and in early
July 2015, the United Nations Educational, Scientific,
and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) warned that
ISIS looting was taking place on an “industrial scale.”
The funds obtained from the illicit sales of these items
have correspondingly been estimated to be quite significant, although they are difficult to calculate with
exactitude. ISIS’s ability to loot cultural heritage sights
expanded dramatically in 2014. Early in that year, ISIS
became the dominant anti-government opposition
group in Syria by defeating the al-Nusra Front (now
called the Jabhat Fatah al-Sham) throughout north-
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ern Syria and bringing the city of Raqqa under their
complete control by January 13, 2014. Then, in June
2014, ISIS electrified the world with its northern Iraqi
offensive when it captured a large expanse of new territory that included some of Iraq’s most important archeological sites and museums, bringing them under
its control. Although attacks on Iraq’s ancient heritage
were somewhat slow in coming, by January 2015 militants had plundered the Mosul library and burned a
number of books in front of the students in a foretaste
of future actions.
While ISIS had been involved in opportunistic
looting, their policy of destroying ancient sites as a
propaganda event had not fully developed until they
seized northern Iraq in 2014. This situation changed
by late February 2015, when the organization released
a short internet video showing the destruction of a
number of ancient artifacts with sledgehammers and
electric power drills at and around the Mosul Museum. This video was posted for its perceived propaganda value and its potential for impressing prospective recruits with spectacular acts of defiance against
more cosmopolitan values. In March 2015, ISIS moved
forward with its destructive policies using bulldozers
and explosives to destroy the ancient Assyrian city of
Nimrud, southeast of Mosul. ISIS then vandalized the
ancient city of Hatra 1 or 2 days after bulldozing large
portions of Nimrud. ISIS members were seen searching for coins and other small items before the destruction with the bulldozers began. Later, looting was to
become much more comprehensive, sophisticated,
and well-organized.
Another important site that was vandalized in this
time-frame was Nineveh, the oldest of the Assyrian
cities. Also in 2015, ISIS vandalized the ancient Assyr-
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ian city of Khorsabad, which is north of Mosul, and
also looted and destroyed large numbers of small and
less well-known sites. ISIS did not immediately destroy the ancient city of Palmyra in Syria and initially
promised not to do so in an apparent effort to gain the
loyalty of the nearby citizens of Tadmur, who were
known to oppose the Assad regime. This restrain did
not last long, and as ISIS consolidated its rule, it began
to destroy key structures, including two important
temples within the ancient city. They were somewhat
disrupted in their capacity for looting, however, since
most of the small and transportable objects had been
removed from the city before it fell. ISIS fighters in
Palmyra also seemed particularly unsophisticated and
were excessively concerned with finding gold that was
not there. The city was retaken by Syrian government
forces in March 2016, but then lost again when ISIS
captured it in December while the Syrian government
was directing its attention to the fighting in Aleppo.
The ISIS leadership has been exceptionally alert for
ways to improve its finances due to its ongoing needs
for cash. The importance of black market antiquities
sales would correspondingly become magnified as
other sources of income produced results that were
more limited or had dried up completely. U.S. and
Iraqi efforts to weaken and then ultimately destroy
ISIS have made clear progress, particularly regarding
the interdiction of black market oil. Complicating matters further for ISIS, U.S. Government spokespersons
have indicated that ISIS territory has shrunk from its
maximum expansion, approximately 40-45 percent in
Iraq and 20 percent in Syria, by May 2016. These areas
have continued to shrink since then, and by January
2017, Iraqi forces had re-taken all major Iraqi cities
and large towns except for the western half of the city
of Mosul, which remains in ISIS hands.
xv

As it struggles to remain in control of key areas in
Iraq and Syria and to keep its organization alive, ISIS
will continue to seek significant infusions of income
to finance its operations, propaganda, recruiting, and
administration of captured territory. ISIS fighters (and
especially non-Iraqi and non-Syrian fighters in those
countries) are well paid when the organization is
flourishing, and the prospect of acceptable pay is usually among an array of incentives for some Middle East
recruits with few options for living outside of poverty
other than joining ISIS or another such group. Cutting
off this avenue of funding is now especially important
because of ISIS setbacks in transporting oil and imposing “taxes” on captive populations. If ISIS can be
impoverished, it will be a much easier adversary for
friendly forces to defeat in the field. Nevertheless, ISIS
resilience and resourcefulness must be carefully monitored as it seeks other ways to expand its revenue base
that are just as unlikely as their project of antiquities
smuggling once seemed. Additionally, the difference
between defeating ISIS and eradicating it is important.
A defeated ISIS can still function as a terrorist organization even after suffering significant defeats and
sweeping territorial losses. A single important source
of funding can at least allow the organization to maintain itself as it waits for opportunities that may once
again allow it to expand. Whatever antiquities remain
in ISIS hands or can still be stolen by ISIS can therefore be sold as an important part of an ISIS strategy to
remain operational and relevant.
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ANTIQUITIES DESTRUCTION AND ILLICIT
SALES AS SOURCES OF ISIS FUNDING AND
PROPAGANDA
INTRODUCTION
The crimes of the Islamic State Organization (often
called by its older name of the Islamic State of Iraq
and al-Sham or ISIS) against important archeological
sites and museums in Iraq and Syria have been major
and ongoing cultural catastrophes. ISIS crimes against
world culture include deliberately destroying large
and sometimes well-preserved ancient structures at
numerous archeological sites, including the ruins of
important ancient cities such as Nimrud, Palmyra,
Hatra, Nineveh, and others. ISIS leaders have stated
that they are destroying pre-Islamic artifacts and
structures because they are idolatrous, but their motivations and actions are significantly shrewder and
more nuanced than this radical and propagandistic
formulation. Beyond the high-profile acts of artifact
destruction, ISIS is selling large numbers of stolen antiquities in the overseas black market, often in collaboration with professional smugglers.
ISIS crimes against world heritage are sometimes
overshadowed by that organization’s other high profile forms of criminality, including mass executions of
prisoners and civilians, drowning prisoners in metal
cages, beheading foreign hostages, executing children,
burning prisoners alive, and establishing a sexual slavery system based on the enslavement of non-Muslim
women. However, plundering world heritage sites is
also considered a war crime by the United Nations
(UN), and such actions are an important way that ISIS
continues to finance its other crimes. Additionally,
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ISIS leaders seek to use such shocking and dramatic
acts to help consolidate their control over both the territory they have captured and the leadership of the
world jihadist movement. The ISIS leadership further
seeks to use such acts to help erase the national identities of entire nations and remove all relics of any
historical heritage that conflicts with or even fails to
reinforce their favored narrative of re-written history.
More broadly, they are seeking to blur or eliminate
key chapters in human history by striking publicly at
the values of the rest of the world. The United Nations
Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization
(UNESCO) and other sources refer to these actions
as “cultural cleansing” or “cultural terrorism.”1 Yet,
these goals should not obscure the other major ISIS
focus on making significant sums of money through
its looting efforts.
Unfortunately, ISIS is not the only insurgent group
in Syria and Iraq to engage in antiquities looting. According to archaeologists using commercial satellite
imagery, areas under the control of Kurdish forces
in Syria and the al-Qaeda-affiliated al-Nusra Front
(renamed the Jabhat-Fatah al-Sham after supposedly
severing its ties with al-Qaeda) have also experienced
widespread looting, while areas under the control of
the Assad government have also shown at least some
evidence of such activity.2 UNESCO Director Irina Bokova has also stated that al-Nusra has issued “documents and letters” authorizing looters to take antiquities from sites located in areas under their control
in exchange for fees.3 Conversely, the majority of the
damage in the Kurdish area has been classified by
most archaeologists as “minor looting,” which has often been widespread but does not seem to involve significant numbers of large excavations, while the dig-
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ging itself was carried out with pickaxes and shovels
rather than earthmoving equipment.4 The looting in
these areas by non-jihadi groups has no political, ideological, or propaganda goals. It is strictly an effort to
raise illicit funds by selling valuable heritage objects,
although any looting is a loss for humanity.
Under current circumstances, ISIS actions are
significantly more destructive than those of other
groups; and in early July 2015, UNESCO warned that
ISIS looting was taking place on an “industrial scale.”
The funds obtained from the illicit sales of these items
have correspondingly been estimated to be quite significant, although they are difficult to calculate with
exactitude.5 Adding to the misfortune, the current
and previous ISIS-controlled territory in Syria and
Iraq includes some of the earliest cities with complex
economies, early forms of writing, and magnificent
artwork. A number of major ancient civilizations have
flourished in this area due to the fertile soil and the
availability of water. Additionally, in ancient Syria,
the indigenous leadership had important interactions
with both Mesopotamia and Eastern civilizations, and
with the West, including Greece and the Roman Empire, sometimes creating unique and cosmopolitan
societies, heavily involved with a number of trading
partners.6
THE VULNERABILITIES OF SYRIAN AND
IRAQI ANTIQUITIES
The looting of antiquities in the Middle East has
occurred for at least hundreds of years, and it is not
surprising that many important sites have been damaged or destroyed during the course of wars in Iraq
and Syria. Looters and professional smugglers have
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been particularly active in Iraq since the end of the
1991 Gulf War following the weakening of the Iraqi
state at that time.7 In the aftermath of this conflict, the
Saddam Hussein regime dealt with a myriad of economic and security difficulties, and protection for Iraqi
antiquities became less comprehensive than it had
previously been. Thieves also became more skillful
and organized as increasingly lucrative opportunities
for looting became apparent. With typical ruthlessness, Saddam made the looting of antiquities a death
penalty offense, although the profits involved in such
undertakings led some criminal enterprises to accept
this risk.8 The regime itself was also widely suspected
of selling some artifacts to gain hard currency while
facing post-1990 sanctions.9 The chaotic years after the
2003 invasion of Iraq offered even richer opportunities
for looting to smugglers already working in Iraq.10
Syria did not face the same degree of political and
economic isolation as Iraq in the 1990s and early 2000s,
and black market smuggling in antiquities does not
appear to have been a major problem for Damascus at
that time. This situation changed with the March 2011
outbreak of the Syrian Civil War, which grew increasingly virulent in the years that followed. Throughout
the war, combatant forces usually ignored the protection of antiquities as they grasped for a military advantage. In some cases, hostile forces used world heritage
sites for military purposes, such as storing military
supplies or placing troops in areas that offered tactical benefits. These actions have often invited intense
combat in culturally important areas. The minaret of
Aleppo’s historic Umayyad Mosque, for example, was
destroyed in 2013, after it was used for sniper firing positions. Other sites in Syria that have been badly damaged in battle include the Crusader-era Crac des Che-
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valiers castle, the Saint Simeon Church and monastery
complex (about 25 miles from Aleppo), and around
60 percent of Aleppo’s “old city.”11 Throughout the
Middle East and elsewhere, historic castles have often
been placed on commanding terrain, which continues
to offer military advantages up to the present day. In
the Syrian countryside, combatant forces have sometimes used ancient mounds covering unexcavated archeological sites as key terrain for observation posts
or areas to set up defensive fortifications.12
Between 2011-2013, a great deal of looting occurred in Syria, but it appeared to have been opportunistic, profit-oriented, and without ideological
motivations or justifications. Byzantine mosaics from
early Byzantine Christian settlements of Serjilla and
al-Bara, known as the “dead cities” of northern Syria,
were looted along with material from the ancient Roman city of Apamea.13 Apamea had a particularly rich
cultural heritage and was once the home of Seleucid,
Roman, and Byzantine populations. It had been visited by Marc Antony, Cleopatra, and numerous Roman
Emperors. In recent years, the ruins had been famous
for a 2 kilometer street with over 400 columns (of the
original 1,200), which had been restored after a number
of earthquakes. Unfortunately, according to UNESCO
Director-General Bokova, the site at Apamea had “lost
all scientific value” because of 4-5 months of intensive
looting by various criminals and rebel groups, including al-Nusra.14 Additionally, according to some sources, Assad regime soldiers may also have participated
in some of the lootings around that time or at least
failed to protect the site despite having troops in the
area.15 Elsewhere, more than 1,500 items may have
been stolen from museums in Raqqa, the ISIS capital;
although it is unclear how many items remained at
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these museums by the time that ISIS established full
control over the city in January 2014.16 On the positive
side, at least 29 of Syria’s 34 museums of ancient art
were emptied of most of their treasures by antiquities
officials, who shipped them to Damascus to prevent
them from falling into ISIS hands. Over 300,000 pieces
were brought to the capital in 2014, where they were
hidden with their whereabouts reported to be known
by only a few specialists.17
ISIS played no role in the outbreak of the Syrian
Civil War in 2011 and was not an important player in
this conflict until 2013. Rather, ISIS forces arrived in
northeastern Syria as a defeated force of al-Qaeda affiliated fighters who had fled the Iraq war. They then
attempted to reconstitute themselves outside of Iraqi
borders, intending to return to that country after they
had regained lost strength with the aid of a strong influx of foreign fighters. This group had named itself
the Islamic State in Iraq (ISI) in 2006, and it was an
important combatant in that country throughout the
mid-2000s. Later, ISI was defeated in Iraq after U.S.
counterinsurgency tactics improved and, perhaps
most importantly, through vigorous action by the
U.S.-sponsored Awakening Council militias. After being routed in Iraq, ISI found the opportunity to rebuild
in Syria and changed its name to ISIS to reflect its role
in both countries.18 Initially, the Assad regime avoided
combat with ISIS, especially while that group was attacking rival rebel forces to seize territory from them,
with heavy casualties on all sides.19 The militants responded to regime restraint by avoiding conflict with
the Syrian military, and instead expanded and consolidated their hold over territory previously controlled
by rival insurgent militias. Throughout 2013 and into
2014, the Syrian dictator clearly hoped that the West
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would be forced to accept or even support the continuation of his regime in power if his most serious
enemy and possible replacement was a jihadist terrorist organization such as ISIS. The mutual restraint between the regime and ISIS dramatically ended in the
summer of 2014, when an increasingly strong and energized ISIS attacked government forces in an effort to
seize territory and military infrastructure controlled
by the regime.20
In January 2014, ISIS undertook intensive military
operations against the al-Nusra Front in Syria’s Raqqa,
Idlib, and Aleppo provinces, with significant casualties on both sides despite their relatively compatible ideologies and status at the time as separate but
formally-allied affiliates of al-Qaeda. Despite heavy
losses, ISIS emerged as the victor in this fighting, and
the city of Raqqa came under their complete control
by January 13, 2014.21 In many of its actions, the ISIS
leadership ignored any guidance given to them by the
al-Qaeda leadership in Pakistan. On February 2, 2014,
the situation reached a crisis point when al-Qaeda
leader Ayman al-Zawahiri released a statement disassociating his organization from ISIS, therefore expelling the organization from al-Qaeda. This action was
not a significant setback for ISIS, which continued to
expand its power by seizing territory from the control
of the al-Nusra Front and other rebel groups. Al-Qaeda, by contrast, has progressively faded in importance
and is no longer a serious ISIS rival for leadership of
the world jihadist movement, except in Yemen.22
In June 2014, ISIS electrified the world with its
northern Iraqi offensive when it captured a large expanse of new territory. All four Iraqi army divisions
in the north collapsed almost instantly when faced
with the threat of ISIS assaults, and ISIS quickly seized
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Iraq’s second largest city, Mosul. The ISIS capture of
large portions of Iraq’s northern regions in the summer of 2014 placed some of Iraq’s most important archeological sites and museums under its control. The
territory captured by ISIS had around 1,800 of Iraq’s
12,000 registered archeological sites, including a number of important Assyrian sites.23 Although attacks on
Iraq’s ancient heritage were somewhat slow in coming, by January 2015, militants plundered the Mosul
library and burned a number of books (including a
number of priceless old manuscripts) in front of the
students in a foretaste of future actions.24
The ISIS establishment of a caliphate on June 29,
2014, refuted the existing state structures in the Middle East and presented an alternative to these systems
that was supposedly based on the early political structures of the Islamic community. ISIS leaders also declared their caliphate to reaffirm their organization’s
role as the leading jihadist entity in the world and to
express opposition to any form of nationalism that
glorifies or even includes a pre-Islamic civilization as
part of a country’s national heritage.25 Secular Iraqi
dictator Saddam Hussein had previously exemplified
this trend by publicly associating his government with
ancient Babylonian kings, maintaining that his regime
was the heir of the great civilizations of the Mesopotamian past.26 The ISIS policy of destroying artifacts
is correspondingly a repudiation of those who would
seek to build a national identity, not exclusively based
on their apocalyptic form of Islam. It is also an effort to eradicate any sort of Arab identity in favor of
an ISIS-defined Islamic one. In contrast, Syria under
Assad has been a secular nationalist regime that has
expressed considerable pride in the country’s Arab
heritage.
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As the Syrian and Iraqi fighting continued into
2014, it was not immediately clear that ISIS was a
greater danger to these countries’ heritage than any
other combatant in the war was. While ISIS had been
involved in opportunistic looting, their policy of destroying ancient sites as propaganda events had not
fully developed when they seized northern Iraq in
2014. This situation clearly changed by late February 2015, when the organization released a short internet video showing the destruction of a number
of ancient artifacts with sledgehammers and electric
power drills at and around the Mosul Museum.27 This
video was posted for its perceived propaganda value
and its potential for impressing prospective recruits
with spectacular acts of defiance against more cosmopolitan values. Various archaeologists, viewing the
video, initially hoped and apparently believed that
some of the items destroyed were modern replicas of
ancient objects, but they also noted that many such
items were also genuine. Later analysis indicated that
the destroyed pieces suspected of being replicas were
genuine relics that had been partially reconstructed.28
Many of the museum relics destroyed by ISIS were
stone relics from ancient Hatra, dating to the Seleucid
Empire, which followed the conquests of Alexander
the Great. After the Seleucids, Hatra remained important as part of the Parthian empire and withstood
sieges ordered by Roman emperors including Trajan
and Septimius Severus.29
In March 2015, ISIS moved forward with its destructive policies using bulldozers and explosives to
destroy the ancient Assyrian city of Nimrud, about
18 miles southeast of Mosul. Nimrud was founded
more than 3,300 years ago by the Assyrian King Shalamansar I (who died in 1245 B.C.) and became one of
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the central cities of the Assyrian empire. Prior to the
ISIS vandalism, Nimrud’s statues and frescos were
considered among Iraq’s finest relics. ISIS destroyed
or defaced many of these objects, including the huge
lamassus (mythological winged bulls or winged lions
with human heads) which guarded the Nergal Gate
entryway to ancient Nineveh. The massive scale of
the destruction was confirmed by Iraq’s Ministry of
Tourism and Antiquities and by commercial satellite
imagery.30 The only bright spot in this tragedy is that
many of Nimrud’s relics (and other Iraqi antiquities)
had previously been placed at the British Museum,
the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York, and
Iraq’s National Museum in Baghdad; and were, therefore, safe from ISIS destruction.31 Some of Nimrud’s
relics were also at the Mosul Museum, where they
were subject to destruction by ISIS.
ISIS vandalized ancient Hatra 1 or 2 days after
bulldozing Nimrud. Hatra is 68 miles southwest of
Mosul and was the home of numerous temples devoted to a variety of gods. Before ISIS destroyed the site,
Hatra had a number of elaborate frescos, including
some dedicated to the sun god, Shamash, and a number of large temples.32 UNESCO called the destruction
of Hatra in July 2015 “cultural cleansing” and a war
crime, but such charges were not taken seriously by
the militants and might have even amused them. One
ISIS member announced on video, “We will destroy
your artifacts and idols anywhere, and Islamic State
will rule your lands.”33 Video from Hatra showed
ISIS personnel using gunfire, sledgehammers, and
pickaxes to destroy sites in Hatra, including statues,
carvings, and building walls.34 By this time, Islamic
leaders throughout the world had condemned ISIS
cultural vandalism and destruction of artifacts, but
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these protests were ignored by ISIS forces. The clerical
leadership of Egypt’s al-Azhar University, the world’s
leading Islamic university, for example, called such
actions “a major crime against the entire world,” but
such statements meant nothing to ISIS.35
Another important site that was vandalized in
this time-frame was Nineveh, the oldest of the Assyrian cities. The destruction included the Nergal Gate,
which was flanked by two large lamassus and was
an especially serious loss. ISIS defaced these statues
with power drills, but did not use explosives to level
them. Also in 2015, ISIS vandalized the ancient Assyrian city of Khorsabad, which is north of Mosul and
was built by Sargon II shortly after he came to power
in 721 B.C.; it was partially abandoned upon his death
in war in 705 B.C.36 Its huge lamassu was badly damaged. Moreover, ISIS has also looted and destroyed
large numbers of small and less well-known sites.
When ISIS vandalized Nimrud, Hatra, and related
sites, it was not clear that the organization had a fully
developed strategy for selling looted artifacts, but
ISIS members were seen searching for coins and other
small items before the destruction with the bulldozers
began.37 Later looting was to become much more comprehensive, sophisticated, and well-organized.
The situation started to improve in Iraq as the government began to re-establish its control over much
of the northern part of that country in 2016. The town
of modern Nimrud and the adjacent ruins was liberated by Iraqi troops from the Ninth Armored Division
in mid-November 2016.38 Ninth Division soldiers also
captured the village of Numaniya around a half mile
from the ruins. At this point in time, Nineveh, Hatra,
and Khorsabad remained under ISIS control. In Nimrud itself, ISIS seems to have made an effort to destroy
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any remaining features of the ancient city before they
were forced to retreat in the face of the Iraqi offensive. In particular, a great deal of damage was done
to Nimrud’s 140-foot step pyramid (known as a ziggurat). Iraq’s Deputy Culture Minister stated that a
special antiquities security team would be stationed at
Nimrud to protect the ruins, but this does not seem to
have happened. Rather, the Iraqi government’s need
to focus on the slow and painful offensive against
Mosul appears to have reduced protecting antiquities
to a minor afterthought. While ISIS did not return to
Nimrud, various looters are believed to have searched
for valuables there. This was certainly a risky undertaking, since ISIS tends to place traps and mines in the
areas that they are forced to evacuate. In December
2016, a heroic Iraqi archeologist was reported to have
visited the liberated site several times and persuaded
a local militia to provide it some protection.39 In addition, in a rare stroke of luck, Iraqi troops liberating
eastern Mosul in January 2017 discovered more than
100 important antiquities in the house of an ISIS leader who either had fled or been killed before he had the
opportunity to remove them.40
THE DESTRUCTION OF PALMYRA SITES
IN SYRIA
The destruction of key sites within the ancient Syrian city of Palmyra constitutes an important case study
of how ISIS conducts its war on antiquities. Palmyra
oasis is around 130 miles northeast of Damascus and
even today is a key strategic site for threatening the
city. In antiquity, it was a caravan city at the crossroads
of Rome and Persia. The city had become part of the
Roman Empire in the early 1st century and is gener-
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ally most well-known for Palmyrene Queen Zenobia’s
revolt against Rome in A.D. 269-271. Zenobia briefly
succeeded in holding the Levant and Egypt until her
forces were crushed by the Roman Emperor Aurelian,
a highly professional former general.41 According to
UNESCO head Bokova, “the art and architecture of
Palmyra standing at the crossroads of several civilizations is a symbol of the complexity and wealth of
the Syrian identity and history.”42 Bokova, therefore,
makes the point that while Palmyra is often described
as a “Roman city,” the city’s appearance and culture
was a hybrid of Roman and non-Roman influences.
ISIS captured Palmyra on May 21, 2015, well after
the release of videos showing the destruction in the
ancient cities of Iraq and the treasures of the Mosul
Museum. It also overran Tadmur, the modern town
next to Palmyra, which had been supportive of the
opposition to the Assad regime and was, therefore,
presumably at least somewhat open to cooperation
with ISIS. In 2012, there was even a small anti-Assad
insurgency there, which the government crushed.43
The Assad regime had also launched airstrikes against
Tadmur and further alienated the population.44 Consequently, leading citizens of Tadmur spoke with
some anti-regime credibility when they attempted to
persuade ISIS not to destroy the ancient city. Historical precedent seemed to be on the side of Tadmur’s
citizens. Islamic general Khalid ibn al-Walid, a companion of the Prophet Mohammed, captured Palmyra
as part of a campaign against Byzantium during the
early days of Islam and felt no need to destroy it.
Under these circumstances, ISIS initially did not
destroy the most important archeological sites in Palmyra, focusing instead on the execution of captured
Syrian soldiers and government officials.45 ISIS carried
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out executions by firing squad in the ancient theater
and also destroyed the important tower tombs on the
outskirts of the city.46 They further seriously damaged
the famous Lion of al-Lat statue that once guarded the
al-Lat temple and, in modern times, was placed outside the Palmyra Museum.47 Shortly after Palmyra’s
capture, the ISIS commander there, using the name
Abu Laith al-Saudi, stated that, “Concerning the historical city, we will preserve [it] and it will not undergo damages.”48 However, there were always dangers,
and no one could reasonably assume the site was safe
under ISIS occupation. Ancient Palmyra worshiped
Eastern Gods led by the trinity of Bel (their most powerful god), Yarhibol (the sun) and Aglibol (the moon).49
The spectacular Temple of Bel seemed in particular
danger since it was associated with a pagan deity, albeit from a dead religion. ISIS also arrested Palmyra’s
82-year old chief archaeologist Khaled al-Asaad, who
had unwisely chosen to remain near the ancient city,
against the advice of the minister of antiquities. ISIS
referred to him as the “director of idols” and tortured
him in the belief that he could provide information
on hidden gold and other valuables. When he failed
to give up any such information, he was beheaded.50
Despite previous assurances, ISIS began destroying
important sites within Palmyra in August 2015 when
it used explosives to bring down the Temple of Baal
Shamin (a Phoenician storm god). This structure was
a beautiful and well-preserved temple, but it was also
small. Concern about future ISIS actions, therefore,
quickly shifted to the large and important Temple of
Bel. This elaborate structure reflected the tradition
that temples to especially important gods were often
the largest and most elaborate buildings within the
ancient urban environment. Consecrated in A.D. 32,
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Syrian Antiquities Minister Maamoun Abdulkarim
said that the Bel Temple was “the most important
temple in Syria and one of the most important in the
whole Middle East.”51 Local civilians, alarmed by the
loss of the Baal Shamin Temple, began to suspect the
worst and sought to persuade ISIS not to destroy the
Bel Temple, arguing that it had at times been used as
a place of Muslim worship.52 These entreaties failed,
and ISIS brought the structure down with explosives
later in August 2015. Then, in early October 2015,
ISIS destroyed Palmyra’s Arch of Triumph as a part
of the ongoing destruction of the city. The arch had
no religious significance, and its destruction served
no clear ideological purpose. In late October 2015, the
vandalism continued when ISIS executed three people
by tying them to three of Palmyra’s columns and then
blowing up the columns.53 This behavior appears to
be some combination of histrionics and a malicious
delight in vandalism and unusual forms of execution,
rather than an effort to strike at religious “idols” of a
competing religion.
The strategic location of Palmyra meant that its
recapture remained a serious priority for the regime,
which initiated an offensive into the area in late March
2016. Russian and Syrian aircraft began this effort by
bombing Tadmur, which had been deserted by most
of its civilian populations due to severe shortages of
food and other basics, previous regime bombing, and
ISIS brutality. Shortly before the offensive, Assad had
agreed to a UN-sponsored “cessation of hostilities,”
which did not include ISIS or al-Nusra. This cessation—while fragile, subject to frequent violations, and
ultimately quite brief—allowed the dictator to shift
some Syrian and allied troops to the Palmyra operation. Additionally, Moscow acknowledged that it had
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provided a great deal of air support and an undisclosed number of Special Forces troops on the ground
helping with the offensive, at least one of whom was
killed.54 In late March 2016, Syrian forces and their allies defeated ISIS and drove its fighters from Palmyra.
After the battle, Russian engineers using specialized
equipment and robotics helped to remove mines from
Palmyra.55 Also, and extremely unfortunately, looting
may not have ended with the expulsion of ISIS from
the city (which sadly turned out to be temporary). According to a leading German archeologist, government
troops may have been involved in stealing antiquities
either at the direction of the regime or on their own
with officers overlooking the indiscipline. The scale of
this activity is not known, and the original sources of
this information are unclear, but both UNESCO and
the German government have taken the allegations
seriously.56
Following the March 2016 battle, Syrian military
officials described the Tadmur/Palmyra area as a
“launchpad” for their planned operations against
Raqqa and Deir al-Zor, but the regime also took care to
assert that they had recaptured one of the Arab world’s
greatest archeological treasures.57 At the time, archeologists differed widely over what structures and relics might eventually be restored and which buildings
and items were beyond restoration. Syria’s antiquities
chief, Maamoun Abdulkarim, stated that the Temple
of Bel was not beyond repair.58 Unfortunately, the
Syrian government was too quick to claim that ISIS
had been driven from Palmyra permanently and that
restoration could begin. In the aftermath of the Assad
regime’s victory, the organization still controlled the
town of Arak (21 miles from Palmyra) and maintained
a large number of forces in Sukhna (42 miles from Pal-
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myra).59 ISIS took advantage of this situation to retake
Palmyra in December 2016 while large elements of
the Syrian military and its allies were focused on the
fighting in Aleppo.
The second ISIS occupation of Palmyra has allowed that organization to destroy many of the remaining relics and structures that exist in the ancient
city, including significant portions of the Roman amphitheater, which they had previously kept to conduct
executions. They also destroyed the city’s tetrapylon,
which had included four separate columned structures that marked the end of the ancient city’s colonnade along its central conduit for foot and cart traffic.60
The rapid ISIS strike to re-capture Palmyra further
gave that organization a propaganda victory at a time
when Assad appeared to be winning the war with its
capture of all of Aleppo. Since the war is ongoing, it
is not clear how long ISIS will be able to maintain its
position in Palmyra or how many more times Palmyra
may change hands.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF SYSTEMIZED
LOOTING IN SYRIA AND IRAQ
As noted earlier, initial ISIS looting in Iraq and
Syria was mainly haphazard and opportunistic theft.
These efforts became increasingly organized over
time, and some Iraqi officials have made the argument
that the destruction of high profile treasures was done
in part to distract attention from the trafficking of other antiquities by ISIS for their financial gain.61 Moreover, smuggling antiquities presents fewer logistical
challenges than smuggling bulk products such as oil.
Small items are especially easy to smuggle and can still
be worth considerable sums of money, in some cases
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millions of dollars.62 Such items include cuneiform
tablets, jars, figurines, coins, glass, and cylinder seals
and their imprints. One source has stated that in the
immediate aftermath of the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq,
high-quality cylinder seals (which can fit in a pocket) were stolen that could be worth around $250,000
each on the black market.63 Mosaics can be removed
by placing a covering cloth over them with dissolvable glue and then lifting the cover.64 Many professional smugglers can also smuggle medium-sized relics without much trouble. For example, when thieves
and smugglers encounter a statue or funeral frieze,
they sometimes saw it into pieces for easier transportation.65 Other times, they can simply cut the statue’s
head off and sell it separately. Towering statues like
some of the lamassus are too large for easy transportation and are correspondingly worthless to smugglers.
Sometimes antiquities smugglers and weapons traffickers are the same people, so ISIS would have probably known some of these people before it had seized
large tracts of territory.66
The total volume of ISIS illicit trade in antiquities
is impossible to assess with any precision, although
some U.S. officials maintained in 2015 that it might
have reached more than $100 million per year since
mid-2014.67 Iraq’s UN Ambassador Mohammed Ali
al-Hakim has quoted the same number, but may have
obtained it from U.S. or UN sources.68 Recent Russian
estimates are even higher.69 Whatever the number, ISIS
clearly sees a great deal of potential in the sale of illegal antiquities. To facilitate their antiquities trafficking
efforts, the organization has established a “ministry of
antiquities” to organize looting and make certain that
their organization receives a substantial share of the
profits from the thousands of small-scale excavation
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efforts in both countries.70 Some scholars believe that
ISIS is carefully managing the flow of antiquities into
the black market to prevent a serious glut and keep
prices as high as possible.71 This strategy would also
allow the organization to keep a large number of antiquities in reserve to be introduced into the market
at a more opportune time. Even so, large numbers of
antiquities are entering the market.
ISIS’s office overseeing concessions for mining and
archeological investigations maintains an “artifacts
section,” which has imposed a 12.5-20 percent tax on
the sale of looted antiquities by professional smugglers working in Iraq and Syria with ISIS permission.72
The discrepancy in these numbers may indicate separate criminal groups negotiating with ISIS for the opportunity to loot different sites under a variety of conditions. This tax was initially handled in an informal
way, but the entire process of looting and smuggling
has become more institutionalized over time. ISIS issues licenses through its archaeological administration offices, which grant permission to look for relics
in specific areas and then share in the profits.73 According to a senior U.S. State Department official quoting
an analysis based on captured documents, ISIS “devotes considerable administrative and logistical resources” to the efforts in antiquities smuggling.74 Once
the antiquities are looted, ISIS often works through
smugglers and middlemen. Such people have the contacts and the specialized knowledge to sell artifacts
to potential collectors and probably get a good price.
ISIS has also attempted to sell some looted artifacts
online through specialized, clandestine websites, but
these efforts seem to be centered on the sale of cheaper
pieces that might not have been worth the time of a
professional middleman.
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Some smugglers working with ISIS in Syria and
Iraq are believed to be well connected to Turkish organized crime syndicates, especially in the border cities
of Gaziantep and Akcakale.75 Turkey has a 565-mile
border with Syria, but most of the smuggling is believed to occur in a 70-mile stretch of the border between these countries.76 The Washington Post reporter
David Ignatius has called this area “a superhighway
for extremist fighters, cash and supplies.”77 Routes
used for smuggling antiquities are also known for
trafficking people, firearms, and drugs.78 In the past,
Turkey has sometimes been considered insufficiently
vigilant in dealing with ISIS due to strong disagreements with the United States on a variety of issues,
particularly Turkish policies toward the Syrian Kurds,
which Turkey seemed to treat as a more dangerous
threat than ISIS. This outlook now seems to have
changed, and Turkey has dramatically cracked down
on ISIS as a result of terrorist bombings in Turkey and
particularly the dramatic terrorist assault on Istanbul’s Ataturk Airport in late June 2016, which killed
44 people.79 Additionally, a 2016 military offensive by
the moderate Syrian Democratic Forces against the
“Manbij pocket” south of the Syrian-Turkish border
helped to disrupt smuggling.80
Many antiquities have also been smuggled through
Lebanon, and some are known to have been transported through Jordan.81 Once antiquities are infiltrated
out of the war zones, they can then be sold to unscrupulous dealers in a variety of countries. Somewhere
during this process, false papers are usually issued for
the artifacts indicating a non-Iraqi/Syrian origin. All
antiquities from Syria and Iraq are currently subject
to suspicion, and some dealers are correspondingly
storing this material in the belief that the pressure
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from anti-smuggling forces will eventually decrease.82
Moreover, after years of warfare and looting, the market for stolen antiquities is not optimal for selling especially valuable pieces. Corrupt dealers continue to
buy such antiquities, but they are sometimes storing
valuable pieces as a long-term investment for sale in
the years to come.83
A window into ISIS sales of looted art was opened
in May 2015 when a U.S. Special Forces unit raided
the Syrian home of Abu Sayyaf, the organization’s top
financial official. Abu Sayyaf, who was killed in the
raid, was well known for his involvement in illicit oil
trafficking, but his role in antiquities trafficking was
somewhat hazy until it was revealed in documents
seized in the attack. In addition to a variety of documents on ISIS financing and computer equipment,
U.S. forces found his house filled with stolen relics, including jewelry, coins, pottery, and an ancient Assyrian Bible.84 The raid was conducted quickly, but even
under these conditions, U.S. forces seized over 400
small artifacts, worth millions of dollars.85 These treasures were later returned to the Iraqi government.86
Captured ISIS laptops, cell phones, and flash drives
from this raid (and possibly in other instances) have
provided important information about the nature and
profit of illicit antiquity sales.87
Another interesting wrinkle in the ISIS approach
to antiquities involves the increased use of fake relics.
As the organization began to understand the fundraising potential of illicit antiquities sales, it apparently
moved to address any shortfall in such items by sponsoring the manufacture of such replicas to be sold as
originals. In late 2016, Syria’s director of antiquities
estimated that about 70 percent of the “antiquities”
trafficked through Lebanon and Turkey were repro-
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ductions meant to be passed off as originals.88 Several
years earlier the number had been closer to 30 percent.
Some items were made poorly, but over time, ISIS has
employed skilled artisans who can make items such
as gold coins that appear indistinguishable from the
original items. The use of such artisans to engage in
artifacts forgery may indicate how seriously ISIS has
planned its efforts to squeeze as much money as possible out of the antiquities market.
Developing countermeasures against antiquities
smuggling by ISIS and other groups has been a challenge, but some progress has occurred in various key
countries. In Turkey, special police anti-smuggling
forces have confiscated thousands of illegal antiquities. From 2011 until early 2016, Turkey seized 6,800
articles looted by ISIS and other groups, the majority
of which were coins.89 These items have been locked
in vaults in Turkish museums and will be returned to
their countries of origin when the wars end.90 Jordan
and Lebanon have also intensified anti-smuggling
raids.91 In one recent operation alone, Lebanese police captured a truck carrying 79 precious objects,
including items that had been looted from Palmyra.92
Lebanon has impounded such objects in warehouses
and has taken responsibility for them as long as they
are on Lebanese territory. The Lebanese have also indicated their willingness to return the objects upon
receiving a repatriation request from responsible
authorities.
The most important countermeasure for this type
of illegal action, of course, would be for legitimate
institutions and collectors to reduce or stop buying
art of questionable origins, but this approach is more
controversial than one would expect. Some museum
officials and reputable antiquities dealers have argued
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in favor of buying trafficked antiquities rather than
accept a situation where they might be destroyed.93
While some museum administrators and antiquities
dealers have purchased art they believed to have been
looted in the past, they have often done so in the fear
that the alternative was for the piece to disappear
into the world of private collectors, never to be seen
publicly again.94 Buying from criminals seeking profits is not, however, the same thing as buying artifacts
in ways that support terrorism or feed the coffers of
an organization that frequently commits war crimes
and destroys world heritage objects it cannot sell.95
This difference has become more important to law enforcement agencies of a number of countries and may
help to discourage some questionable future sales. On
the demand side, the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) has issued a warning that purchasing an object
looted from Syria or Iraq could result in prosecution
for financial support to a terrorist organization.96
ISIS SOURCES OF INCOME AND THE
IMPORTANCE OF ANTIQUITIES TRAFFICKING
One of ISIS’s greatest strengths has been its oftenimpressive level of financial self-sufficiency, which
has enabled the organization to avoid dependency on
external sympathizers (although such funding does
occur). Nevertheless, ISIS does need continuing significant infusions of income to finance its operations,
propaganda, recruiting, and administration of captured territory. ISIS fighters (and especially non-Iraqi
and non-Syrian fighters) are well paid when the organization is flourishing, and the prospect of acceptable
pay is usually among an array of incentives for many
Middle East recruits with few options for living out-
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side of poverty other than joining ISIS or another such
group.97 High pay and privileges for its fighters also
help to prevent desertions that have been an ongoing
ISIS problem, despite desertion being punishable by
death, but expenses other than salaries exist as well.98
While ISIS is most well-known for ruling by fear, it
has also attempted to gain the backing of Sunni tribes
and individuals in the territory it controls through
funding tribal leaders and providing some services
in tribal areas.99 ISIS has also sought to attract or retain skilled workers and professionals (particularly oil
field administrators and technicians) in the territory it
controls, sometimes through high salaries and lenient
treatment.100 The financial requirements to address
these concerns can be difficult to maintain in periods
of setback, but failure to do so can result in serious
consequences. The ISIS leadership is aware of these
problems, but some fighters’ salaries were reduced in
late 2015 in response to ISIS budget cutting.101 ISIS also
closed some schools and hospitals in territories under
its control to save money.102 While ISIS leaders probably do not care about the education of the young, they
use schools for ideological indoctrination, suggesting
that the organization may view the school closures as
a setback.
The ISIS leadership has been exceptionally alert for
ways to improve its finances due to its ongoing needs
for cash. The importance of black market antiquities
sales would correspondingly become magnified as
other sources of income produce more limited results
or dry up completely. Since 2014, some analysts have
even identified antiquities trafficking as the second
most important source of ISIS income, after oil smuggling.103 Complicating matters further, oil smuggling
has sometimes involved serious difficulties due to the
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vulnerabilities of key infrastructure and transportation assets. Some of the oil facilities previously under
ISIS control have been recaptured, and numerous
large and even smaller facilities and oil tanker trucks
have been bombed and correspondingly destroyed
or damaged in combat.104 The Russians also bombed
a number of oil-related targets after their military intervention in Syria in September 2014.105 Moreover,
smuggled oil is sold well below the standard rate (or
there would be no need for a black market) and is thus
especially vulnerable to declining oil prices.106
By late 2015, ISIS faced additional financial setbacks due to problems with the “tax system” that it
had set up for people in the territories it controls. By
this time, the Baghdad government had stopped paying the salaries of the Iraqi state and municipal employees serving in the ISIS-occupied territory.107 While
the Iraqi government originally hoped to support citizens under occupation, it was forced to end this policy
when ISIS confiscated large portions of the transferred
funds. In response to problems with this and other
revenue streams, ISIS raised its taxes on civilians in
money and property just as they were reeling from the
halt of state salaries, previously spent throughout occupied Iraq.108 These moves helped to provoke a further economic crisis, which spurred many civilians to
flee from ISIS as it intensified its merciless drive for
revenue and other resources, including confiscated
houses, cars, trucks, and livestock.109 In Mosul, the
crisis became so serious that many people risked execution to escape to government-controlled areas.110 In
late 2015, the population of Mosul was around 600,000,
down from 1.2 million as people continued to escape
ISIS-controlled territory.111 Complicating matters further for ISIS, U.S. Government spokespersons have
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indicated that ISIS territory has shrunk by around 4045 percent in Iraq and 20 percent in Syria by May 2016
from its maximum expansion in both countries.112 In
Iraq, ISIS had been driven out of such cities as Tikrit,
Baiji, Ramadi, Fallujah, and Sinjar. Further ISIS withdrawals have occurred since that time, including its
ouster from the eastern half of the city of Mosul. While
the expulsion of ISIS from these territories represented important progress for the Iraqi government, ISIS
continues to exploit the population remaining under
its control (perhaps especially in Syria) with progressively more impoverishing taxes.
Many other sources of ISIS funding also appear
to be in trouble. ISIS has an estimated $675 million
seized from captured Mosul banks, but this seizure is
a one-time prize, and some of ISIS’s stored currency
has been destroyed in bombing raids.113 Hostagetaking is also a declining source of ISIS funding, because fewer foreign citizens are placing themselves in
harm’s way.114 It is also unclear how much help ISIS
has received from foreign (particularly Gulf) supporters, but the leaderships of the Gulf states have made
a strong effort since 2014 to disprove the occasional
charge that they are a “permissive environment” for
radical fundraising. This effort has included arrests of
radical fundraisers and lengthy prison sentences for
those involved in many such activities. Interestingly,
the level of fundraising in these instances seems to be
relatively modest and not much of a contribution to
addressing ISIS economic needs.115 The increasingly
high profile of ISIS crimes, including those against
Sunni tribes in Syria and Iraq, may further undermine
foreign Sunni Arab support of ISIS.
As these other sources of funding face ongoing
disruption, the importance of antiquities smuggling
may play an increasingly important role in funding
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the organization, at least in the short term while other
approaches to funding are investigated. In this regard, Palmyra and other sites under their control can
be expected to yield many antiquities for some time
to come, although ISIS may have to offer more generous profit sharing to smugglers and criminals willing to excavate sites for additional artifacts, should it
become more dependent on these people. They also
may have to more carefully exploit the considerable museum holdings, which have not always been
examined in any methodical way.
CONCLUSIONS
Organizational survival is the highest priority of
ISIS leaders, since their crimes are so monumental
that they would probably never be able to hide from
all their enemies if the organization was eventually
crushed. ISIS therefore needs spectacular acts of terrorism and defiance to bring in new recruits and to
help intimidate opponents on the ground. It also seeks
to project strength to limit potential resistance in the
areas under its control. Beyond these concerns, the
organization must generate funds despite U.S.-led
efforts to bankrupt it. By both destroying and selling
antiquities, ISIS is seeking to meet some of its most
important goals for organizational survival. It is also
possible that the Iraqi officials quoted earlier in this
Letort Paper are correct when they suggest that the
destruction of large and important antiquities is at
least partially meant to serve as a smokescreen for the
vast network of illegal antiquities sales. However, for
now, both the propaganda and financial aspects of the
destruction of antiquities need to be considered and
countered. The following recommendations are made
with these concerns in mind.
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1. Political and military leaders of the anti-ISIS
coalition must understand that protecting antiquities is a national security issue and not simply a
distraction from other more tactically important aspects of the current fighting in Iraq and Syria. While
protecting antiquities and culture must never be prioritized more than saving human lives, this simple
binary principle is not useful in situations where an
adversary can use looted antiquities to help fund their
war effort. In retrospect, the decision not to use coalition aircraft already bombing Syria to strike ISIS forces
advancing across the desert toward Palmyra in May
2015 may not have given adequate weight to this linkage. The factors militating against the bombing were
also serious, including a desire not to be seen as tacitly
supporting Bashar Assad’s Syrian army; but the costs
of this restraint may have been a stronger and betterfunded ISIS.
2. Efforts to curb smuggling and the sale of looted
goods must be continued and intensified throughout
the world and particularly in the West. The West’s
insatiable desire for ancient art and relics needs to be
refocused away from the blood antiquities of Syria,
Iraq, and other looted countries. Simply stated, one
cannot protect antiquities by bankrolling the people
who destroy them.
3. The United States and the West need to be
aware of methods that are not working in the effort
to prevent the destruction and looting of precious
antiquities. UNESCO and a variety of world leaders
have called ISIS actions “war crimes,” but ISIS fighters
have never shown themselves to be deterred by such
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declarations. Moreover, if ISIS leaders were concerned
about being tried for war crimes, they would have to
change just about everything that they do. The list of
ISIS war crimes is now so long that it is difficult to see
how additional charges relating to antiquities trafficking could have an impact. In addition, as previously
noted, some ISIS members enjoy infuriating the world
with these actions. If they are threatened with war
crimes charges, this only means that they are irritating the people that they seek to irritate. While there
is nothing wrong with a public declaration that these
actions are war crimes, it is a mistake to assume that
this will have any influence on ISIS actions.
4. U.S. leaders need to continuously assess and
seek to counter the resilience and inventiveness of
ISIS leaders in their struggle for survival and organizational success. At the time of this writing, ISIS has
suffered many serious setbacks both in efforts to fund
itself and in the struggle to control territory in both
Iraq and Syria. Financial and territorial setbacks are
serious, but it is much too early to assume that they
will be fatal to the organization or that ISIS will not
engage in new and effective counterattacks or morph
into a terrorist organization that has suspended efforts to rule as a caliphate. Rather, ISIS has shown a
remarkable ability to adapt, and further exploitation
of looted material may become an important part of
future efforts by the organization to remain viable.
Consequently, efforts to limit and then end ISIS looting must be adaptive and evolving as ISIS alters its
tactics and adjusts its operations.
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5. The role of Turkey as a partner in fighting ISIS
may have to be given special consideration, and the
United States should consider any Turkish requests
for technological support to seal their border to the
extent that it can under current circumstances, including ongoing difficulties with President Erdogan.
Additionally, it may be possible to expand intelligence
cooperation on counterterrorism issues. Although the
United States and Turkey have maintained different
views of the danger of ISIS in the past, the two nations
are now much closer together on how they view that
organization. The July 2016 terrorist attack on Ataturk
Airport and subsequent incidents have raised Turkish
anger with ISIS to a white heat, and Washington needs
to be as supportive as possible of Turkish anti-ISIS actions. Additionally, the United States should remain
alert to ways that it can help Turkish actions against
ISIS outside of the border area, including crackdowns
on ISIS recruiting in Turkish slums. Unfortunately,
U.S. leaders may not be able to go as far as they wish
in counterterrorism cooperation due to ongoing difficulties with Turkey over other issues.
6. The financial pressure on ISIS must remain unrelenting, and the organization’s inventiveness and
resourcefulness in dealing with setbacks and the
ways ISIS might circumvent security measures designed to stem the flow of illicit antiquities must be
carefully considered. In this regard, ISIS has remained
capable of smuggling limited supplies of black market oil to various interested parties for a considerable
period of time after the coalition escalated operations
against oil related targets. Likewise, improved smuggling efforts could be discovered by ISIS through trial
and error. It is important that ISIS success be quickly
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stymied once it occurs—in antiquities smuggling and
all other money-making ventures. Future military operations against ISIS will greatly benefit from impoverishing that organization to the greatest extent possible. Hollowing out ISIS by depriving it of funds could
be particularly important as the Iraqi Army prepares
for the next stage in the effort to liberate all of Mosul.
7. The legacy of the problems with the illicit
antiquities trade in Syria and Iraq will have to be
remembered when evaluating other insurgencies in
countries elsewhere in the world. Now that ISIS has
demonstrated the lucrative nature of the antiquities
trade for funding insurgent activities and terrorism
in Syria and Iraq, other groups or other branches of
ISIS have begun either to engage in similar actions or
may well do so when the opportunity presents itself.
This process has already become a serious issue in
Libya. Antiquities looting is also a problem in Egypt,
although it is not likely that much of this looting is terrorist related, but is more likely crime related. Yemen,
which is currently involved in a major civil war, also
has a culturally rich heritage that could at some point
be exploited by jihadists operating out of that country.
U.S. intelligence officers seeking to support allies such
as those with advice and expertise might find it useful
to remain aware of the importance of protecting antiquities sites and remaining aware of smuggling activities that involve ancient relics in countries of interest.
8. U.S leaders must also be aware that jihadist
looting and involvement in the illicit antiquities
trade in Iraq and especially Syria will almost certainly continue after the defeat of ISIS unless stable
and effective governments can assume control. The
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large and powerful al-Nusra Front (Jabhat Fatah alSham) has, for example, already been involved in the
illegal antiquities trade and would clearly expand this
involvement if it was able to control more territory.
The U.S. Government must correspondingly remain
vigilant for terrorist efforts to finance their operations
through illegal antiquities sales even after ISIS has
been destroyed.
9. U.S. information officials, including U.S. Army
public affairs officers in Iraq, should emphasize coalition progress in the struggle to save world heritage. They should also note the FBI and other warnings
that the purchase of such objects can lead to criminal
prosecution. The purpose of such efforts would not
simply be to underscore the positive actions of the
coalition military. It is also important to continue to
emphasize the costs of dealing with shady antiquities
dealers attempting to sell items looted from Iraq and
Syria. Moreover, the United States should disseminate
any credible information and videos proving the increased ISIS sale of fake antiquities as a way of discrediting ISIS as a source of rare relics.
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